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The role of multimedia and user interactivity has increased in recent years. User 
interaction is an important component of emerging multimedia systems, and the 
methods of interaction will become increasingly complex as they are being used 
in more diverse applications. One such application is surveillance, both in the 
civil as well as the military domain. The real-time three-dimensional 
stereovision adds sense of immersion and makes imagery closer to those 
produced by our own eyes as described in [1]. In our paper we propose a 
framework to capture an unfolding scenario as it happens and transmit the 
captured media using SMIL securely to a group of users with varied privileges. 
Apart form enforcing privileged access our model also ensures integrity of the 
content in transit through encryption 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Consider the following situation wherein a court of law is examining a critical 
piece of evidence, where an audio-visual feed from the surveillance camera in a 
parking lot. This camera feed shows an accused firing at a person. In reality the 
shooting could have been a defensive action to avoid the victim trying to stab 
the shooter from behind. A camera form a single stationary angle is insufficient 
to capture this scene in its complete detail. Having multiple cameras 
simultaneously recording this scene from different angles would have revealed 
the total scene as it unfolded. These multiple feeds could be instantly combined 
and processed into a real-time interactive three-dimensional video. The 
interactivity and the ability to switch view points would have given the 
investigators and the jury the liberty to look around the surroundings of scenario 
as seen from multiple points of view before making their conclusions.  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- -----------------
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In addition to the capturing the situations as they unfold, there is a need to 
effectively transmit the captured detail to intended recipients in a secure way.  
Access control and Integrity are the key factors because we do not want any 
unauthorized people to access the content as well as we want it to be safe from 
tampering and unwanted modification. Synchronized Multimedia Integration 
Language (SMIL)[4] is a XML like language that enables us to integrate real-
time media and enforce a security policy that is contained within the SMIL 
document.  
 
In this paper we propose a methodology for implementing access control by 
embedding the authorization rules in the SMIL document created for   
transmitting media that is captured during surveillance. The primary motive is 
the actual transmission and display of mayday information (via surveillance) 
using low-cost off-the-shelf software (Web browser and scripting) and open 
standards (SMIL, XSL, and HTTP). 
 
Providing such features require many technical challenges to be solved and 
integrated. Various trade-offs and compromises will be required so that 
different pieces of existing technology can be artfully combined to create a new 
and advanced multimedia environment. These tradeoffs need to be evaluated in 
light of quality to effectiveness tradeoffs of enhanced QoS parameters [2] 
associated with looking around and stereoscopy. Since proposed services 
support numerous audio and video streams, substantial bandwidth will be 
required for memory, I/O and the network so that the key functionalities like 
mediate stream acquisition, processing, transmission and display site 
management utilize system resources efficiently, but satisfy the user’s 
qualitative needs.   
   
The remaining paper is organized as follows; Section 2 discusses the related 
work. Section 3 describes surveillance, Section 4 introduces SMIL, Section 5 
describes Multiparticipant Stereo video, Sections 6 and 7 explain the access 
control and encryption, Section 8 summarizes the future work and Section 9 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. Related Work 
  
Schmidt [1] has defined an architecture for distributed multi-participant and 
interactive multimedia with a structure that enables multiple users to share 
media streams within a network distributed environment. Multimedia streams, 
consisting of audio and video originating from various sources can be combined 
to provide media clips that accommodate look-around capabilities. We use this 
model for the purpose of surveillance and the relevant architecture is described 
in the later sections. 
 
Regulating access to XML documents of textual nature has been actively 
researched in the past few years after it has been accepted that XML is soon 
going to become the de-facto standard for the World Wide Web. Bertino et al 
[6,7,8,9], Damiani et al [13,14,15,16] and Gabillon et al [5] have suggested 
access control models for controlling access to XML documents. 
 
Bertino et al [7,8,9], have developed Author-X, a Java based system to secure 
XML documents that supports access control policies at various granularities 
and user credentials. Author-X encodes security policies for a set of XML 
documents in an XML file referred to as the policy base. They permit both 
permissions and prohibitions. This feature enables the user to specify exceptions 
with ease as opposed to creating a set of XML documents and document type 
definitions (DTD’s). There are conflict-resolution and default strategies to 
address over specification and under specification respectively. 
 
Damiani et al [13,14] developed an access control model where the tree 
structure of XML documents are exploited using XPATH [17] to control access 
at different levels of granularity. Here, the smallest protection granularity is a 
node, and permissions or prohibits to a node can be defined. Fine-grained 
accesses are specified using XML markup where a subject is a user who is 
generally a member of one or more user groups, and an object is any node on a 
XPATH tree.   
 
Gabillon et al [35] have suggested an alternative to Damiani et al [13,14], where 
authorization rules related to a specific XML document are first defined on a 
separate authorization sheet (style sheet). This sheet is then translated to an 
(eXtensible Stylesheet Language) XSL sheet. If a user requests access to the 
XML document then the (XSL Transforms) XSLT [18] processor uses the 
XSLT sheet to compute the view of the XML document with appropriate rights. 
 
Damiani et al [15] have proposed a model for selectively controlling access to 
images. The XML based data model of SVG is exploited to control access to 
graphic information on the web. The primary focus is the vector image data, 
which has emerged as an alternative to contemporary raster image formats. 
But none of these proposals are completely satisfactory for multimedia. They 
primarily address textual documents and exploit the granular structure of XML 
documents. Although [15] addresses feature protection of XML format based 
images, its primary focus is controlled dissemination of sensitive data within an 
image. Multimedia for various reasons as discussed above has to be treated 
differently in our framework we use an XSLT processor to deal on our 
authorization mechanism as well as propose a variation to the encryption model 
of Bertino et al [8,9]. 
  
Boneh et al [10] proposed a public key encryption scheme for multimedia in 
which there is one encryption key and multiple decryption keys. Multimedia 
content is encrypted and distributed over a broadcast channel to subscribers, and 
the decoder box has the secret decryption key, which decrypts the public 
broadcast. Problems of users sharing   decryption keys or groups of users 
colluding to create a new decryption key are addressed and a traitor-tracing 
scheme is implemented to identify traitors. Fiat et al [11] proposed a dynamic 
traitor-tracing scheme, where systems with conditional accesses are safeguarded 
using watermarking. The root of any potential piracy is traced and it is 
disconnected from the regular transmission without harming legitimate users. 
Using their approach it is also possible to gather forensic evidence to 
incriminate the abusers. 
 
 Both [10] and [11] address the issue of multimedia and are very effective for 
commercial Cable TV applications, but cannot be adapted “as is” in the context 
of multimedia presentation over the any private network or the internet because 
of the watermarking and the variations of the media clips generated thus are 
huge and would be very server intensive, thereby could result in a bottleneck.  
 
3. Physical Surveillance and Emergency Response. 
 
Current surveillance systems, such as those available on common desktops and 
the Internet consists of audio and video either collected live, such as a camera 
mounted on a tall building, or served out of a storage device with or without an 
accompanying audio stream. But in order to implement surveillance on a 
commercial scale for real-time applications, rates as minimal as 30 video frames 
per second and synchronized audio and video delivery are the need of the hour.  
 
Let us consider the scenario in which we use multiple cameras and microphones 
to capture an accident at a frequent accident zone in Fairfax, VA. The city 
council has decided to declare Vinerva Circle as a Level II danger zone, because 
of the high frequency of accidents that have been recorded in the past year. The 
council has decided to install multiple cameras and microphones that constantly 
provide real time audio and video for physical surveillance. An Emergency 
Help Center is created wherein the feeds from the camera and audio  
 
 
Figure 1: An Example Scenario 
 
devices are received and processed.  Let us assume that every vehicle-owning 
citizen of the city is a mandatory subscriber. Each individual subscriber is 
provided with a sensor that has to be installed on the vehicle. This sensor is 
used to detect and record vehicle status before, during, and after the collision, 
e.g. change in velocity, angle of impact, airbag deployment, rollover, and 
ending position. At service initiation users are required to provide critical as 
well as some personal information (age, domicile, blood type etc) upon which 
appropriate decisions can be made in the event of an emergency. This and any 
other relevant information obtained by filling a form are the grouped together as 
a database. The EHC then processes some of this information to uniquely 
distinguish between subscribers based on their rights, requests and privileges 
into a list called the access control list (the functionality of which will be 
described in later sections).  
When an accident occurs there are three distinct types of information that can be 
obtained from the equipment installed for surveillance as shown in Figure 1: 
1) The information obtained from the sensors installed in the subscriber’s car 
2) The live video feed from multiple cameras installed at strategic angles. 
3) The real-time audio associated with its camera at the place of the accident. 
 
Information obtained form the sensors are used for Emergency Response and 
the feeds from the camera and the microphone are used to analyze the situation 
later. The medical data must have been provided in advance by the EHC 
subscriber, with the provision that it will be released to appropriate medical 
personnel only in emergency situations. In the future, real-time traffic 
information could be tied into this system to take current congestion and special 
road conditions into account. 
 
All this information obtained is sent to the EHC through secure and dedicated 
channels as soon as an accident occurs. Then EHC will then add vehicle 
information and medical data about the probable or confirmed occupants of the 
vehicle from its database. The subscriber must previously have authorized 
release of the medical data in case of emergency.   
 
The EHC could send information to three different places: 
 
1) 911 Control Room 
2) EMS Dispatcher 
3) Personal Medical Control Doctor/Hospital 
 
Firstly, the enhanced data is transmitted to the 911-control room. 
 
In our model we create a voice link to a car occupant has been established and 
the call-taker learns additional information (e.g. there is a child in the back 
seat). The EHC will then send information   to the EMS dispatcher all the data it 
has obtained (with relevant medical information), plus any new or corrected 
information obtained by voice link and typed into the data system. In a real 
system, the EHC would have the choice of many possible recipients of the 
information in which case he might have to either broadcast or multicast the 
information securely. 
 
The EMS dispatcher views relevant portions of the data integrated with a 
Computer-Aided Dispatch (CAD) system, dispatches appropriate response 
vehicles and send s back information to the EHC in case of change/addition of 
information. The EHC then transmits the media file to medical control, again 
with possible additions or corrections Medical control receives all the collision 
and medical data, including additions from the EHC and the EMS-dispatcher.  
 .  
In the model all data and media items that arrive at the EHC are stored in the 
form of a Synchronized Multimedia Integration Language (SMIL) file.  SMIL 
start and end tags identify each piece of information and block of information.  
The same SMIL file is passed from each location to the next in the sequence, 
while adhering to rights and privileges of the subscribers by enforcing access 
control as will be discussed in the later sections. All transmission of data files 
between intermediate stations in the network use standard hypertext transfer 
protocol (HTTP) web protocol. When each computer in the process receives a 
data file, it opens a standard web browser window, and then displays the XML 
file in the browser window using a customized extensible Stylesheet Language 
(XSL) style sheet.   
 
The style sheet selects which data items to display and the format for displaying 
them.  Data elements in the file may be made available on a need-to-know basis 
to protect the privacy of subscriber information such as the time the incident 
occurred, the EHC that relayed the call, the location of the incident (looked up 
by a map data base based on the information from the sensors from the given 
GPS-supplied latitude and longitude), some information about the collision, and 
the names of the probable occupants shows up on the computer’s browser 
window after receiving the XML data file and displaying selected portions of it 
with a style sheet.  
   
At the EMS dispatcher’s screen, the updated data file in SMIL format has been 
received, but a different XSL style sheet has selected different portions of the 
data to display. For example, the display may include more detailed information 
about the location of the car and its make, model, and license.  The number of 
occupants field reflects the change made by the call-taker at EHC.  
 
Although the same SMIL data file is transmitted, many different style sheets are 
used to extract privileged and protected information by following an access 
control model. For e.g.: medical information present in the file but not displayed 
to the at all intermediate stations. 
 
While information is sent to the medical unit, the private medical information 
about the occupants such blood type, allergies, current medications, and current 
health are listed, with unusual items shown in red. This information could be 
useful to medical and paramedical personnel. This medical history information 
and contact information for each occupant’s doctor and   additional information 
regarding medical history file are   maintained in the EHC database but are not 
included in the mayday data transmission. Instead, they may be retrieved by an 
authorized medical provider who has been authorized by the victim after the 
SMIL document has been transmitted.  
  
4.  SMIL 
 
SMIL [1] is an XML-like language developed by W3C to author multimedia 
presentations. The major components of multimedia such as audio, video, text 
and images can be integrated and synchronized to form a presentation or a   
media clip. The distinguishing features that separate SMIL from XML are well-
defined syntactic constructs for timing and synchronization of media streams 
that allow fine-grained synchronization. SMIL also has syntax for spatial layout 
including constructs for non-textual and non-image media and hyperlink 
support for time-based media making SMIL adaptable to varying user and 
system characteristics. 
 
The important integration features offered by SMIL are the synchronization 
constructs such as <seq>, <excl> <repeat> and <par>. They are used to 
hierarchically specify synchronized multimedia documents. The <seq> element 
plays the child elements one after another in sequential order. In such a 
hierarchical specification  <excl> element plays one child at a time, but does not 
impose any order. The <par> element plays child elements as a group (allowing 
parallel playback).  In SMIL, every element has a beginning (begin) and a 
simple duration.  Begin can be specified in various ways, an element can begin 
at a given time, or based upon when another element begins or when some 
event occurs. Simple duration defines the basic presentation time of an element. 
Elements can be specified to repeat their simple duration a fixed finite number 
of times. The simple duration and any repetitions can be combined to determine 
the so-called active duration. An element becomes active when it begins its 
active duration, and becomes inactive when it ends its active duration. When an 
element's active duration terminates, the element can either be removed from 
the presentation or frozen meaning it is held in its terminal state: e.g., to fill 
dead-times in the presentation. Attributes that control these synchronization 
specifications can be applied not only to media elements, but to complex 
constructs (par, seq etc) as well. 
 
 
Figure 2: SMIL representation of information received at EHC 
  
 
This allows, for example, an entire sequence to be repeated, and to be 
coordinated as a unit with other media and complex presentations such as media 
clips. Audio and video, which constitute basic multimedia stream types, can be 
combined to form a media clip by using the synchronization constraints to 
specify the exact synchronization we need. SMIL has been constantly 
developing and becoming rich in features and is supported by many present–day 
commercial browsers and was developed to work with many commercial and 
free media players. 
 
An example SMIL document given in Figure2 shows how the information 
received at the EHC is combined to make a multimedia presentation. As the 
figure shows there are four forms of media video, audio, text and image that are 
integrated and synchronized using <seq> and <par> and duration. The primitive 
media entity is a frame, many of which are grouped together to form scenes. 
The audio, video and text frames (if any) run in parallel to combine and render a 
scene for a clip. A group of scenes constitute a shot, the EHC defines how many 
and which scenes constitute a shot. In our model we chose a “shot” as the level 
of granularity on which we impose access control and encryption. As shown in 
the figure above, the tree structure of SMIL is depicted for a media clip at the 
shot, scene and frame level. 
 
5.  Multi-participant Stereo Video 
 
After the emergency response phase, we would now process the real-time video 
and audio received form the scene as it unfolded. The EHC will have control 
over the cameras installed at the location and would be able to switch from one 
to another real-time. Further the cameras can be rotated and made to “look-
around” thereby providing a 3-d view and sense of immersion. We would have 
multiple feeds from different cameras and the EHC needs to clearly edit the 
irrelevant information and make an informative media clip out of it. All the 
feeds are combined to form a three-dimensional video of the scenario with look-
around capability. We use SMIL and its timing constructs as discussed in 
Section 5 to make a multimedia clip form the information at hand and can 
transmit it securely to any authorized station with the access privileges 
appropriately enforced. The Figure3 below shows a SMIL structure of a media 
clip that is generated based on the information received and is carefully divided 
into shots. Each shot is based on a set of authorization rules that are derived 
from the access control list. 
 
 
Figure 3: Media Clip generated as a combination of “shots”. 
 
6.  Access Control Model 
 
After the process of creating the shots and the SMIL document we need to 
specify   authorization control rules made based access control list, which was  
generated based on the subscriber information and their rights and preferences. 
The authorization rules are formulated and represented on XML style sheet 
called XPAS (XML Policy Authorization Sheet). This is a typical XSL sheet 
that is in accordance to [18]. 
 
The time-container tags encompass the frames and scenes and the level of 
granularity is the shot, which means that we would divide the entire document 
into a sequence of individual shots upon which conditional and privileged 
access and encryption can be implemented to enforce security. 
 
Any SMIL document can be represented as a tree with “n” number of nodes. 
XPATH [15] is a regular language for denoting nodes of an XML document. 
Since the syntactic structure of SMIL is similar to XML syntax we use XPATH 
to address individual nodes. The authorization rules specify access privileges 
granted to the user when he subscribes to the service. In these rules, subjects are 
subscribers of the EHC and he/she is uniquely identified by some attributes as 
discussed in earlier sections An object is any node in a XPATH tree. The most 
helpful feature of XPATH it facilitates pattern matching using regular 
expressions. This is helpful in identifying objects that meet and adhere to the 
specified policy.   
 
A pattern search is run on the XPATH tree to yield what shots he/she can 
possibly see. An XSL Transform [XSLT] [18] is used to convey the 
authorization rules to the SMIL document and extract the nodes that obey the 
authorization rules. As mentioned earlier each intermediate station that the 
information passes through has a different XSLT pertinent to the authorization 
and access privileges that it enjoys The transformation is the actual interface 
that relates the authorization stylesheet to the SMIL specification of the media 
clip. XSLT understands the rules as patterns and using XPATH parses through 
the SMIL document and retrieves the appropriate shots. 
 
In our example we consider three types of classifications based on the receiving 
station. These   classifications are based on the “need-to-know” of each station 
and the personal preference and rights of the subscriber. All pertinent controls 
that are decided based on the access policies and security considerations can be 
very precisely represented using SMIL and thereby essentially capture even 
minute detail that is necessary. A list of all permissible shots can de derived and 
represented in the SMIL specification. The SMIL document in Figure4 below 
shows how we specify the access constraints in SMIL. 
 
7.  Encryption Model 
  
The encryption model is analogous to the real world methodology [10] adopted 
when broadcasting secure data (e.g. bank information, stock quotes) via the 
Internet. A smartcard, which contains the authorization rules based on the 
access control list, is installed on the all the intermediate stations. It could be a 
hardware device or a software program to achieve the same result. 
 
Figure 4: The media clip with embedded Access policy. 
 
 
It has an inbuilt Cryptix Parser that is programmed in firmware (or in software) 
to handle the decryption process that is described below. Decrypting the 
associated shots in a broadcasted environment is the primary functionality of the 
intelligent Cryptix parser within the smartcard.   
 
The encryption model uses both symmetric encryption and Public Key 
encryption for two mutually diverse events to serve varying purposes. 
  
Step1: 
The SMIL format of the media clip is divided into shots as discussed earlier, 
and since our element of granularity is a “shot”; we encrypt each shot with a 
unique Symmetric Key. In the SMIL document shot1 is encrypted with 
SymmetricKeyshot1 and shot2 with SymmetricKeyShot2 and the process is 
repeated for all the shots within the document. All the encrypted shots have a 
corresponding symmetric decryption key (which is the same as the encryption 
key). Based on the subscriber authorization rules a finite number of symmetric 
decryption keys strictly corresponding to the allowed shots are grouped together 
as a vector of keys (keyvector). This distinct keyvector for a particular station 
would be able to release all or a subset of shots depending on the their nature 
and the authorization rules decided by the authoritative body for this 
intermediate station.  
 
Step 2: 
When information is sent to an intermediate station a keyvector is generated and 
is then encrypted with the PublicKey of   the particular station. The format of 
the keyvector is as follows: 
 
PublicKey of Station ((SymmetricDecryptionKeyNumber (Shot Number)….... 
…SymmetricDecryptionKeyN (ShotN)))  
 
We do not encrypt the entire media clip with a Public Key, because all the shots 
are encrypted, any unintended or malicious recipient cannot view the media clip 
even though they have access to it, thereby eliminating the need for such a 
methodology. 
 
 The keyvector (a finite set of valid symmetric decryption keys) encrypted with 
the PublicKey of the recipient station is unicast to the intermediate station prior 
to the actual broadcast of the media clip. Eventually when the media clip 
arrives, the decryption process is initiated and completed by the CryptixParser. 
 
Figure 5: Media Clip with the shots individually encrypted. 
There are unique decryption key vectors specific to each individual 
transmission, that encompass the diverse privileges of both the 
victim/subscriber and the remote station so we transfer the load from the server   
onto remote intermediate station 
  
The server at the EHC takes the following steps: 
1. Create the keyvector, encrypt with the PublicKey of the client (station) 
and deliver (unicast) it to the smartcard on the client machine. 
2. Broadcast the encrypted media clip. 
 
Each client (station) receiving a key vector takes the following steps: 
1. Decrypt the received keyvector and install on the smartcard. 
2. Decrypt the encrypted parts of the media clip with available symmetric 
decryption keys. 
 
In a broadcast environment where there is more than one user, which is 
generally the case, there is a significant delay between shots in the media clip. 
This is because the encrypted shots arrive sequentially and there is a delay 
associated with the decryption process and the sequential order of the viewable 
shots. Real time system issues such as the ability of the client to download the 
keys as well as the encrypted media clip well in advance, so as to decrypt and 
buffer the valid shots in a sequential order to minimize any significant delay is 
an open issue that we intend to address in very soon. 
 
8.  Future Research 
 
The model we discussed above can be enhanced to encompass enhanced user 
interactions such as fast forward, rewind, fast play: controls found on home 
VCR’s. This enhancement would enable us to carefully examine the implicit 
detail and allow us to make assertions based on the media information that we 
capture. This is precisely the focus of our future research. 
 
9.  Conclusion 
 
We have provided a model for advancing state of the art in audio-video services 
to provide 3-dimensional stereoscopic multimedia, where the source has a 
collection of cameras and microphones. The information (both text and video) is 
securely transmitted as SMIL documents with access control and encryption. 
We have provided a wider view with multiple perspectives. Secondly, our 
provides much more depth information than the view of a single camera and the 
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